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You Have the Right to Be Silent..
Anything You Do Not Say May Be
Used Against You. Is The Right to
Silence in Great Britain Really a
Protection?
I. Introduction
Like the Miranda' warnings so well recognized in the United
States, Great Britain2 has a caution that is familiar to its citizens.3
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)(holding inter alia that when an
individual is taken into custody or is in some way deprived of his freedom by
authorities, that individual must be warned prior to questioning that he has the
right to remain silent and that anything he says may be used against him in a court
of law).
2. This Comment only deals with the right to silence in Great Britain, which
includes England, Wales, and Scotland. THE STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK 1318
(Brian Hunter ed., 1994). The United Kingdom consists of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland. Id. Northern Ireland will not be considered for purposes of this
Comment. The newly passed right to silence does not apply to Northern Ireland,
as a similar law has existed there since 1988. See The Criminal Evidence (N.I.)
Order 1988. For information on the right to silence in Northern Ireland see
Richard Maloney, Note, The Criminal Evidence (N.L) Order 1988: A Radical
Departure from the Common Law Right to Silence in the U.K.?, 16 B.C. INT'L &
COMp. L. REV. 425 (1993).
3. John Benyon, Powers and Proprieties in the Police Station, in THE POLICE:
POWERS, PROCEDURES AND PROPRIETIES 118 (John Benyon & Colin Bourn eds.,
1986). The caution states "You do not have to say anything unless you wish to do
so, but what you say may be given in evidence." Police and Criminal Evidence
Act (s.66) Codes of Practice (1991)[hereinafter Codes of Practice] Code C, 10.4.
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This warning, referred to as the right to silence, has been used for
three decades.4  However, a debate has been brewing for years
about whether the right to silence should be eliminated.5 Parlia-
ment recently passed the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 6
modifying the right to silence by lengthening the police caution.7
The new caution could severely limit, if not eliminate, the right to
silence.8 Under the wording of the new caution, police officers will
recite the following: "You do not have to say anything. But it may
harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned
something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say
may be given in evidence."9
This new caution and its suspected impact has aroused great
public criticism towards the Home Secretary, Michael Howard."
Specifically, some people fear that the caution is too difficult to
understand." It is also argued that the caution will be too
ambiguous for even a legal advisor to interpret. 2 If counsel is
4. Richard Ford, Length of Police Caution is Tripled, THE TIMES (London),
Aug. 19, 1994, at 1.
5. See generally Steven Greer, The Right to Silence: A Review of the Current
Debate, 53 MOD. L. REV. 709 (1990) (giving an overview of the right to silence
and issues surrounding the debate).
6. William E. Schmidt, Silence May Speak Against the Accused in Britain,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1994, at B20. The right to silence under the Criminal Justice
and Public Order Bill was narrowly passed by Parliament in October 1994 and
received Royal Assent in November 1994. Id. It went into effect in April 1995.
Richard Ford, First National DNA Database to Carry Details of 5m People, THE
TIMES (London), April 11, 1995.
7. Schmidt, supra note 6, at B20.
8. Id. Although the new caution warns that an individual does not have to
answer the questions of officers, the new caution also warns that such silence could
be used against him or her if the case goes to trial. Id.
9. Ford, supra note 6.
10. See Roger Ede, Russian Roulette - A Criticism of the Clauses Abolishing
the Right to Silence in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill, LAW SOC'Y
GAZETTE, May 11, 1994, at 12. The Home Office is responsible for the
administration of justice. This includes the areas of criminal law, the treatment of
adult and juvenile offenders, the police force, crime prevention, regulation of
dangerous drugs, regulation of fire arms, fire service, emergency planning, licensing
laws, electoral laws, and local legislation. CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION,
BRITAIN 1995: AN OFFICIAL HANDBOOK 512 (1994).
11. Michael Zander, Silence Isn't Just for Crooks, THE TIMES (London), Aug.
20, 1994, at 14. Although research has not been done on the new caution, a study
has been done on the present caution by Isabel Claire and Ghisli Gudjonnson. Id.
One hundred adults with an IQ in the 60-128 range were tested. Id. Only 52%
understood that the warning is given to inform the person being questioned that
he has the right to remain silent. Id. Furthermore, only 42% fully understood the
caution, also known as the Notice to Detained Persons. Id.
12. Ede, supra note 10, at 12.
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unable to comprehend the limitations of the caution, there is a
concern that the new right to silence may interfere with counsel's
effectiveness, which then will interfere with the right to counsel
13
provided by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984
[hereinafter PACE].14 One of the strongest arguments against the
change is that courts may infer guilt from silence.
15
Long before the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994
was enacted, Great Britain did not give suspects the right to silence
in crimes prosecuted by the Serious Fraud Office [hereinafter
SFO]. 6 The SFO's most successful prosecution came against
Ernest Saunders, the former Chief Executive Officer of Guinness
plc.17 Nonetheless, that major victory has suffered a major defeat.
Saunders brought his case before the European Commission of
Human Rights [hereinafter Commission]. 8 In its 14-1 majority
opinion, the Commission found that the manner in which Saunders
was questioned violated the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 9 [hereinafter
Convention].2' This case has been referred to the European
Court of Human Rights [hereinafter Court].2' Because the new
13. Id. Roger Ede is the secretary to the Law Society's criminal law
committee. Id. Ede's con6ern is that legal advisors will not know under what
circumstances they should advise their clients to remain silent or to cooperate with
the authorities. See id.
14. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 58 (Eng.) [hereinafter PACE].
Section 58(1) states that "[a] person arrested and held in custody in a police
station or other premises shall be entitled, if he so requests, to consult a solicitor
privately at any time." Id.
15. Ede, supra note 10, at 12.
16. Criminal Justice Act 1987, s 2 (Eng.). The Criminal Justice Act created
the Serious Fraud Office. Id at s 1. The SFO is the primary body that prosecutes
financial crime. Frank Kane, DTI Discredited, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Oct. 16,
1994. In the outline of the Director's Investigation Powers, the Director is given
the power to require the person whose affairs are being investigated, or any person
believed to have pertinent information, to answer questions and provide all
relevant information. Criminal Justice Act 1987 s 2(2). A person who fails to
comply with this requirement put forth by the Director is guilty of an offense and
is subject to a fine and imprisonment for up to six months. Id. s 2(13).
17. See Kane, supra note 16.
18. Melvyn Marckus, Guinness is Good for Whom?, THE TIMES (London),
Sept. 24, 1994, at 24.
19. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, Nov. 1, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention].
20. Marckus, supra note 18. The Commission found that the United Kingdom
deprived Saunders of a fair trial. See id. This is a violation of article 6 which
entitles everyone to a fair trial and public hearing when faced with a criminal
charge. Convention, supra note 19.
21. Marckus, supra note 18.
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caution will have an effect similar to that carried out by the SFO,
the Commission decision raises serious questions as to whether or
not the new right to silence caution will be challenged by the
Commission.22
Part II of this Comment will examine the previous right to
silence, which was not a statutory directive. In addition, both the
effect and effectiveness of the previously used caution will be
discussed. Part III then focuses on the newly passed right to
silence and its likely impact on the rights of the suspect. Part III
also considers the speculation of the manner in which detainees will
have to react to police questioning. This Part further considers the
concern among solicitors regarding the best way to advise their
clients. Finally, Part IV focuses on several cases that already have
been or are currently pending pursuant to the terms of the
Convention. These cases will be used in analyzing how the new
right to silence and its accompanying caution is likely to be treated
with regard to the Convention.
II. The Previous Right to Silence
In the beginning of the Twentieth Century, the Chief Consta-
ble of Birmingham asked the Lord Chief Justice Alverstone to
formulate a set of rules the judges believed policemen should
follow while investigating crimes.' The reply resulted in what is
known as Judges' Rules24 which consisted of four Rules when it
was first announced in 1912 Following bouts of criticism, these
Rules were clarified in 1930 and revised in 1947 and 1948.26 Then,
in 1961, a question arose as to who had the power to review the
scope and operation of the Rules.2 7 This question was resolved in
favor of the judges.28 Once again, in 1964, the judges of the
Queen's Bench revised the Rules which, in turn, were adopted by
the Home Office.2 9
22. Schmidt, supra note 6, at B20.
23. Tony Judge, The Provisions in Practice, in THE POLICE: POWERS,
PROCEDURES AND PROPRIETIES 175, 176 (John Benyon & Colin Bourn eds. 1986).





28. Id. The Home Secretary, Mr. R.A. Butler, in agreement with the Lord
Chief Justice, announced to the House of Commons that the authority to review
was vested in the judges. FELLMAN, supra note 24, at 35.
29. Id.
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The 1964 Rules provided for the right to silence and the right
to be advised of that right.30 Rule II directed a police officer to
caution a person, reasonably suspected of committing an offense,
before putting forth any questions relating to that subject. 31 When
a person was charged, Rule III(a) required that the suspect be
warned that he was not obligated to say anything.
3 2
Further, Rule III(b) solidified the right to silence by requiring
the police officer to advise the suspect that he was not obligated to
answer any of the questions about the offense.33 However, any
statements that were made were written down.3 4 More important-
ly, the suspect was also required to sign his name or mark to a
written version of the caution, signaling his understanding of the
right to remain silent.35 If the person making the statement chose
to write the statement himself, that person would first be asked to
write out the caution and sign a declaration of knowledge and
understanding of his right not to say anything.36
Although the right to silence was made clear in the Judges'
Rules, it should be emphasized that the Judges' Rules were not a
legislative product, nor were they promulgated with any type of
consultation.37 The Court of Criminal Appeal specifically stated
that the rules were intended only as a guide for police officers.3"
30. Home Office Circular No. 31/1964, reprinted in The Judges' Rules and
Administrative Directives to the Police 1964 CRIM. L. REV. 161,167-73 [hereinafter
Home Office Circular No. 31/1964]. This latest version is somewhat longer and
more defined than its predecessor. The 1947 version directly preceding the current
version is reprinted in PATRICK DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN
ENGLAND 115-18 app. (1960). The original version, which is significantly shorter
than the current set of Rules, is reprinted in R. v. Voisin 1 K.B. 531, 539 note 3
(1918).
31. Home Office Circular No. 31/1964, supra note 30, at 167.
32. Id. at 168.
33. Id.
34. Id. Rule III provides: "[a]ny questions put and answers given relating to
the offence must be contemporaneously recorded in full and the record signed by
that person or if he refuses by the interrogating officer." Id. Rule IV describes
how all written statements made after the caution should be taken. See Home
Office Circular No. 31/1964, supra note 30, at 168-69.
35.. Id. at 168.
36. Id. at 169. The Judges' Rules were followed by the Administrative
Directions on Interrogations and the Taking of Statements which makes clear,
especially in sections two and six, that the police are to make sure that the suspect
understands his right to silence. Id. at 170-72.
37. Michael Zander, The Act in the Station, in THE POLICE: POWERS,
PROCEDURES AND PROPRIETIES 123 (John Benyon & Colin Bourn eds., 1986).
Even police officers were not consulted in the formulation of the Rules. Id.
38. Voisin, 1 K.B. at 539.
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As such, these Judges' Rules were not law.39 They were merely
administrative directives which police officers were strongly
encouraged to follow to administer justice in the fairest manner
possible.' Police officers were expected to follow them to ensure
that statements gathered would be admissible.41  However,
absence of a caution did not make the evidence inadmissible per
se.42 Instead, the court first considered all of the circumstances in
which the evidence was obtained to determine if the admission of
that evidence would adversely affect the fairness of the proceed-
ings. 43 If such a determination was made, the court would exclude
the unfair evidence.44
A. Codification of the Right to Silence
PACE did not specifically require police officers to caution
suspects before questioning. 45 However, the statute ordered the
Secretary of State to issue four codes of practice for police
officers.' The code most relevant to this discussion is Code C
entitled Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and Question-
ing of Persons by Police Officers.a7 The intent of the Code of
Practice was to "strike a balance between citizens' rights, including
the right to silence, and police powers.,
41
The Code provided that if questions were asked for the
purpose of obtaining evidence which may later be used at trial, the
caution must be administered before questioning.49 In contrast,
if questions were asked for other purposes, such as determining a
suspect's identity, the caution was not necessary.50 When the
caution was administered to a person not under arrest,5" the
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 539-40.
42. Id. at 538.
43. Voisin, 1 K.B. at 538.
44. Id.
45. See generally, PACE, supra note 14.
46. Id. s 66. The four codes deal with (a) the exercise of police powers to
search a person or vehicle before arresting the person; (b) the search of premises
and the seizure of property found on persons or premises; (c) "the detention,
treatment, and questioning of persons by police officers"; and (d) the identification
of individuals by police officers. Id.
47. See Codes of Practice, supra note 3, Code C.
48. SUSAN M. EASTON, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 5 (1991).
49. Codes of Practice, supra note 3, Code C, 1 10.1.
50. Id.
51. The police can question anyone, regardless of their procedural status.
ZANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 128 (6th ed.
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person had to be informed that he was not under arrest, that he
was free to leave at any time, and that he could obtain legal advice
if he so desired.52 When a suspect was arrested, the caution also
had to be administered53 unless to do so was impractical consider-
ing the suspect's behavior or condition.
The exact wording of the caution was set forth in paragraph
10.4 of the Code.54 However, if the words recited by the officer
were not precise, the requirement was not considered breached.
As long as the sense of the caution was preserved, it was consid-
ered valid, pursuant to paragraph 10.4 of Code C.56
The notes following this section of the Code provided guidance
to those who did not understand the caution. The officer could
explain the caution in his own words57 or, if the suspect did not
understand the significance of the caution, the officer was advised
to explain the principle of the right to remain silent and the effect
of doing so. Nonetheless, it was essential that any explanation
of the caution did not give the false impression that failure to
cooperate would prompt automatic release from detention,
especially if biographical information still had to be obtained by the
police officers.59
This Code was considered to have replaced the vague and
ambiguous Judges' Rules.' However, the general substance of
the Rules was not changed by the Code. The principles of the
Judges' Rules preamble were embodied throughout the Code.6
1993).
52. Codes of Practice, supra note 3, Code C, 11 10.2, 3.15.
53. Id. 10.3. The caution also does not have to be administered upon arrest
if the suspect had already been cautioned immediately prior to arrest in
accordance with paragraph 10.1. Id. 11 10.3(a)-(b).
54. Id. 10.4.
55. Id.
56. Codes of Practice, supra note 3, Code C, 10.4.
57. Id. at Note 10C.
58. Id. at Note 10D. The officer would explain that "the caution is given in
pursuance of the general principle of English law that a person need not answer
any questions or provide any information which might tend to incriminate him,
and that no adverse inferences from silence may be drawn at any trial that takes
place." Id.
59. Id.
60. ZANDER, supra note 51, at 127.
61. Compare Home Office Circular No. 31/1964, supra note 30 with Codes of
Practice, supra note 3, Code C, 1 10. Both the Rules and the Code share the
underlying theme of placing both the officer and the suspect on equal ground.
Citizens have a duty to help police officers, but in doing so they must be treated
fairly. The rights to silence and to counsel protect the suspect from being taken
advantage of by the police officers.
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In contrast, the Code was much longer.62 The Code explicitly
detailed procedures to be followed in the station.63 First, and
foremost, the Code required that all persons in custody be dealt
with expeditiously and released as soon as possible.' This Code
also dealt with the keeping of detailed custody records,65 initial
procedures,' the property of a detained individual,67 the right to
contact someone who has an interest in the detainee's where-
abouts,6" the right to legal advice,69 the conditions" and treat-
ment of detained persons, 71 and the guidelines for interviews.
72
The Code was a useful tool not only because it was extensive,
but because it was drafted with input from many interested
parties. 73 Its utility, however, should not completely overshadow
the fact that the Code was not law.74  Its existence was merely
authorized by statute.75
62. ZANDER, supra note 51, at 161. The 1947 version of the Judges Rules and
Administrative Directives as reprinted by Devlin were about 4 pages, see DEVLIN,
supra note 30, compared to the 38 pages of Code C, see supra note 3.
63. ZANDER, supra note 51, at 161.
64. Codes of Practice, supra note 3, Code C, 1 1.1.
65. Id. T 2.1
66. Id. I 3(a). This is also broken down into.specific guidelines for people
unable to understand English or who are hearing impaired (id. 3.6.), juveniles
(id. 11 3.7-3.9), mentally handicapped persons or those suffering from a mental
disease (Codes of Practice, supra note 3, Code C, 1 3.10.), individuals who are
blind, visually handicapped, or unable to read (id. 1 3.14), and individuals who
voluntarily go to the police station (id. 1 3.15-3.16.).
67. Id. 1 4.
68. Id. 1 5.1.
69. - Codes of Practice, supra note 3, Code C, 91 6.
70. Id. 1 8.
71. Id. I 9, 15-17.
72. Id. 11 11-12.
73. ZANDER, supra note 51, at 123. See also Leslie Curtis, Policing the Street,
in THE POLICE: POWERS, PROCEDURES AND PROPRIETIES 95-102 (John Benyon
& Colin Bourn eds., 1986) (providing recommendations made by the Police
Federation to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure and criticisms of the
resulting legislation and accompanying Codes).
74. ZANDER, supra note 51, at 123.
75. PACE, supra, note 14, at s 66. But cf R. v. McCay, 1 All E.R. 232, 235-36
(C.A. 1991). The Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal gave great credence
to the Codes of Practice. Id. It also stated that because both Houses of the
Secretary of State had to approve the Codes before they became effective, the
Codes had "the full authority of Parliament behind it." Id. The Court -based its
judgment on the fact that the procedures from Code D were followed explicitly.
Id.
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B. Usage of the Right to Silence
The right to silence was understood as affecting two specific
areas of the criminal process. First, no person was required to
answer the questions of police officers or to give any statement.76
Second, the right to silence ensured that a person charged with a
criminal offense was not obligated to give evidence that could be
used in court at any stage of the proceeding. 7 This second point
is commonly referred to as the right against self-incrimination.
Under the prior right to silence, a person who exercised that right
was not subject to any automatic sanction during the trial.78
Refusing to respond to questioning by police officers was not
considered willful obstruction of justice.79 Chief Justice Lord
Parker held that wilfulness, in this context, was something done
without legal excuse.8 He held, however, that "the whole basis
of common law is the right of the individual to refuse to answer
questions put to him by persons of authority.""
Even if a suspect remained silent during interrogation, police
officers were not forbidden from continuing questioning.' One
of the underlying goals of detention was to get the person to break
down the wall of silence 3 and cooperate with the officers." In
76. ROGER LENG, THE ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE RIGHT
TO SILENCE IN POLICE INTERROGATION: A STUDY OF SOME OF THE ISSUES
UNDERLYING THE DEBATE 1 (1993).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2. It is argued by many that the new caution will greatly affect the
right against self-incrimination because the prosecution will be able to ask that the
court draw an inference of guilt during the prosecution's case in chief so that the
inference can be added to other evidence that will make out the prima facie case.
The other evidence can be as little as the officer's reasonable grounds for
originally arresting the defendant. Ede, supra note 10, at 12.
79. Rice v. Connolly, 2 Q.B. 414, 418 (C.A. 1966).
80. Id. at 419.
81. Id.
82. See LENG, supra note 76, at 1.
83. To remain silent while continuously being questioned by police officers is
considered to be a very difficult task. Benyon, supra note 3, at 116 [citation
omitted]. Indeed, there have been cases where people have confessed to crimes
which never took place. Id. at 116-17.
84. LENG, supra note 76, at 7. See also Home Office Circular No. 31/1964,
supra note 30, at 166. The preamble to the Judges' Rules sets out principles which
are not to be affected by the Rules. Id. In all situations, the overriding principle
to be presumed is that answers given by a person in response to a police officer's
questions are to be strictly voluntary. Id. at (e). Answers are not to be given in
fear of incurring prejudice or as a result of some inducement exercised by a person
in authority. Id.
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Great Britain, there is a social obligation to aid the police in any
type of investigation."5
Over the past twenty-five years, judges and prosecutors have
been criticized for failing to instruct juries that a suspect's silence
does not indicate guilt.8 6  In 1972, the Criminal Law Revision
Committee [hereinafter CLRC] recommended that juries be
directed to draw an adverse inference if the accused used a defense
at trial which he did not raise during police interrogation.' The
report also recommended that the caution be modified and
administered only when the suspect is actually charged.8 These
proposals were rejected in the 1981 Report by the Royal Commis-
sion on Criminal Procedure, which is a foundation of PACE. 9
According to the report, the proposals placed undue psychological
pressure on the suspect, which might cause him to make incriminat-
ing statements.90 Further, the Commission concluded that the
CLRC recommendations were inconsistent with the placement of
the burden of proof upon the prosecution.9'
The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Study of the Right
to Silence in Police Interrogation is one of the latest reports among
a myriad of studies.92 The research sample used in this report is
85. Rice, 2 Q.B. at 419. See also Home Office Circular No. 31/1964, supra
note 30, at 166. The first principle in the preamble of the Judges' Rules states that
"citizens have a duty to help a police officer to discover and apprehend offenders."
Id. at (a).
86. LENG, supra note 76, at 2.
87. Id. See also Benyon, supra note 3, at 115. This recommendation was
made based on the public perspective that criminals were undermining the law and
that the law of evidence should be more harsh on criminals. Id.
88. LENG, supra note 76, at 3. The caution was administered at the time of
arrest, prior to an interview, and when a person was charged with a criminal
offense. Id
89. Id. It should be noted that PACE neither directly nor indirectly speaks
of the procedure to be used for warning suspects of the rights and consequences
in answering police interrogatories. See generally PACE, supra note 14. The
Commission, as evidenced by its criticism of the CLRC's proposals, considered
changes in the right to silence and the caution providing for the right. See LENG,
supra note 76, at 3. Unable to make any concrete determinations while
constructing PACE, the right to silence was ignored in this statute. The Act
merely authorized a code to be created in regards to this subject. PACE, supra
note 14, at s 66(b). This Code, however, is not law.
90. LENG, supra note 76, at 3.
91. Id.
92. This report gives a synopsis of eleven different studies done since 1979.
Many are criticized for their methods, for their failure to identify which factual
situations qualify as those invoking the right to silence, and for their lack of
recording certain statistics which Leng deems necessary for a thorough understand-
ing of the debate. Id. at 10-15.
RIGHT TO SILENCE IN GREAT BRITAIN
from 1986 to 1988 and consists of 1080 cases from six police
stations.93 Each case was followed from the point of arrest or
record until the final disposition.94 According to this report, the
right to silence is exercised when "having been asked a relevant
question, and having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so,
[a suspect] fails to disclose a particular matter which he later raises
or intends to raise in his [own]
95 defence. 96
Of those cases studied by the Commission, 838 suspects were
interviewed by police. 97 Of those, thirty-eight people exercised
the right to silence (4.5%)98 and eleven more (1.3%) refused to
answer some questions, but not enough to qualify as an exercise of
the right to silence.99
In addition, the findings of the Commission indicate that
suspects who had a solicitor present for some or all of the inter-
view, or who had some legal advice, were more likely to invoke the
right to silence."° In cases where this information was available,
ten percent of the suspects exercised the right to counsel 1'
pursuant to PACE.Y Of the thirty-eight people who exercised
the right to silence, nine (24%) had a solicitor for all or some of
the questioning,10 3 and another seven (18%) received legal advice
in person or on the telephone before questioning began."° These
findings are considered to be consistent with those of other
studies."°5
93. Id. at 6.
94. Id.
95. This study deems silence to be significant only when evidence not disclosed
relates to the suspect's own involvement. Keeping silent about the involvement
of someone else in a criminal offense is not considered to be in the same category
as protection from self-incrimination. LENG, supra note 76, at 8-9.
96. Id. at 8.
97. Id. at 17.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. LENG, supra note 76, at 18.
101. Id.
102. See PACE, supra note 14, s 58 and accompanying text.
103. LENG, supra note 76, at 18.
104. Id. These statistics seem to show that less than half of the people
exercising the right to silence had legal assistance.
105. Id. A more thorough statistical discussion of the correlation between the
right to counsel and the right to silence can be found in MIKE MCCONVILLE &
JACQUELINE HODGSON, ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CUSTODIAL
LEGAL ADVICE AND THE RIGHT TO SILENCE (1993). See also Custodial Legal
Advice and the Right to Silence, 1993 CRIM. L. REV. 477 (providing a review of the
Commission Research Study by McConville and Hodgson).
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A person invokes the right to remain silent to avoid self-
incrimination in the event the case goes to trial. The Royal
Commission Report authored by Roger Leng criticizes some studies
for not following the cases through to the outcome of the case.'0
6
In his research, of the thirty-four cases in which the right to silence
was invoked, outcomes are known for all but four. 7 Of those
thirty-four cases, sixteen cases (47%) resulted in conviction,'08
three cases (9%) ended with not guilty verdicts," six cases (18%)
were dropped later on in proceedings,110 and in nine cases (26%)
no further action was taken beyond the questioning.' The
number of people who exercised the right to silence was low. This
does raise the question of whether or not there should even be a
right to silence. From Leng's study, it is difficult to determine
whether exercising the right to silence is more helpful or harmful.
C. Arguments for Changing the Right to Silence
The ambush defense put forward by defendants was a major
concern to police officers, and was the motivating factor behind the
Home Secretary's proposal to legislate in this area.112 An ambush
defense is a defense that is brought at trial but is unknown prior to
trial to the police and prosecution."' This tactic creates a disad-
vantage to the prosecution because the police are unable to
investigate the defense. As a result, the prosecution is unable to
prepare an effective counterattack to such a defense." 4
106. LENG, supra note 76, at 10-15.
107. See id. at 19.
108. Id. Of the sixteen convictions, nine were a result of a guilty plea and
seven were a result of a guilty verdict after trial. Id.
109. Id.
110. LENG, supra note 76, at 19.
111. Id.
112. ZANDER, supra note 51, at 280. The frequent occurrence of ambush
defenses was also the motivating factor behind Michael Howard's legislation. See
Howard Court Crackdown Condemned by Lawyers, THE HERALD (Glasgow), May
17, 1995, at 6.
113. LENG, supra note 76, at 45. Ambush defenses often have the following
characteristics: (1) they are raised for the first time at trial; (2) they take the
prosecution by surprise; (3) the defense could have been given during interroga-
tion; (4) the prosecution is inconvenienced or prejudiced by the late appearance
of the defense; (5) the accused may be unfairly advantaged because of the time to
perfect and boast his explanation; (6) the risk of acquittal is greater; and (7) the
defense is false. Id. at 47.
114. Id.
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Parliament attempted to curb this problem with the enactment
of the Criminal Justice Act 1967."' Specifically, section 11 of
that Act requires the accused to give the prosecution notice of any
specific alibis and witnesses who will support the defense's case.
116
If a defendant fails to give notice, the trial judge may refuse to
admit the alibi into evidence."1 7 In the event the evidence is
admitted, the judge may comment to the jury on the lack of
notice. 18  The 1972 Criminal Law Revision Committee did not
believe that the. notice requirement was sufficiently effective,
19
and thus recommended that no caution be given before interroga-
tion.1"
Subsequently, the Home Office Working Group was formed
in 1988 to examine the ambush defense problem." It failed to
find any evidence to support the claim of widespread usage of the
defense."2 The Working Group recommended that the caution
be modified to warn suspects that the failure to answer questions
would be recorded, and any failure to raise a defense which is later
used at trial would be less believable to a jury."3 Consistent with
that recommendation, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice
found that ambush defenses occur with much less frequency than
initially claimed by proponents of the elimination of the right to
silence. 24
Exactly what the judge can and cannot say, however, is not as
clear as some assert. On one hand, a judge is permitted to suggest
to the jury that it may question why a suspect would announce that
he is reserving his statement for court, even though no charges
have yet been imposed."z However, judges are unable to com-
115. EASTON, supra note 48, at 11.
116. Criminal Justice Act 1967, s 11(1) (Eng.). The notice is to be given in
accordance with s 144 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980. Id. at s 11(3). This
must be done either in court during or at the end of proceedings before the
examining justices, or in writing to the solicitor. Id. at s 11(6).
117. LENG, supra note 76, at 45.
118. Id.
119. See generally EASTON, supra note 48, at 47-55.
120. See LENG, supra note 76, at 46. The Committee's recommendation was
based on the theory that the caution would provide an excuse for not providing
a false story until it becomes difficult for the prosecution to reveal the actual story.
Id.
121. EASTON, supra note 48, at 24.
122. Id. at 49.
123. LENG, supra note 76, at 46.
124. See id. at 50-55.
125. See R. v. Gerard, 1 All. E.R. 205, 206 (Crim. App. 1948).
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ment on a person's exercise of the right to silence.'26 Further, a
judge cannot instruct the jury to use its common sense when
considering a suspect's refusal to say anything.' This prevents
juries from making adverse inferences based on the suspect's failure
to provide an excuse or explanation."n
Another argument for a modification of the right to silence is
that common sense dictates a response when faced with a serious
accusation. 29 The rationale is that only those who have some-
thing to hide would not attempt to counter the accusation with
some excuse or explanation. 3' Although juries cannot be in-
structed to use common sense,131 and are often instructed not to
consider such adverse inferences, 32 it is doubtful whether jurors
truly put aside their common sense while contemplating a ver-
dict.133
The modification in the right to silence, allowing juries to
consider why silence is used by a suspect, would alleviate some
problems for the jury. For example, an instruction to use common
sense is problematic because common sense is not universal. While
many people expect explanations when confronting people with a
serious accusation,TM there is no justification for applying ambigu-
ous common sense in the lieu of laws. Common sense is a
nebulous concept while laws provide concrete restrictions on what
people can and cannot do. Thus, modifying the right to silence will
help minimize jurors' struggles to put aside their feelings about
what a reasonable person would do when accused of a crime.
135
126. See generally ZANDER, supra 51, at 135-36.
127. R. v. Davis, 43 Crim. App. Rep. 215, 218 (Crim. App. 1959).
128. ZANDER, supra note 51, at 135. There is one instance when a judge may
suggest to a jury that an inference of guilt may be drawn from silence. This
situation arises when two people are speaking on equal terms and the first accuses
the second of a crime but the accused does not deny the accusation. Id. at 135-36.
129. See EASTON, supra note 48, at 62-65.
130. Id. at 62. See also Fiona Bawdon, "I'm Going to Lose it All", THE TIMES
(London), Oct. 18, 1994. A solicitor being accused of assisting a suspect, felt that
he was in a "no-comment" interview, but did not exercise his right to silence for
fear that his failure to speak would impact the jury's decision. Id.
131. Davis, supra note 127, at 218.
132. See EASTON, supra note 48, at 62. The standard direction to the jury states
that anyone suspected or charged with a criminal offence is not obligated to
answer questions about it and that the jury must not hold the silence or refusal to
answer questions against the person at trial. See ZANDER, supra note 51, at 135.
133. See EASTON, supra note 48, at 62.
134. Id. at 63-64.
135. Id.
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III. The New Right to Silence
Years of debate, reports by the Criminal Law Revision
Committee,136 the Home Office Working Group,'37  the Royal
Commission on Criminal Justice,1 38 Home Office Circulars,3 9
and studies by both individuals" and organizations14 have
culminated into governmental action. In 1993, Michael Howard,
the Home Secretary, announced his plan to crack down on
crime.'42 This resulted in the passage of the Criminal Justice and
Public Order Act. 43 The right to silence provisions of this Act
were designed to secure more convictions of guilty individuals.'"
Even though the Act was slightly modified from its original version
as a Bill, not all of the measures were well received by the
public. 45
A. The Right to Silence in Interrogation
Under the new law regarding the right to silence, a suspect
experiences the impact of the changes as soon as the interrogation
begins."4  Since the newly worded caution is longer and more
136. CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, ELEVENTH REPORT, EVIDENCE
(1972).
137. HOME OFFICE, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE RIGHT TO
SILENCE (1989).
138. LENG, supra note 76.
139. See Caroline Ball, Cautioning: A Radical Shift in Policy?, 144 NEW L.J. 495
(1994)(discussing Home Office Circular 18/1994).
140. See generally LENG, supra note 76, at 10-15 (a quick review of a variety of
studies by individuals).
141. See Curtis, supra note 73, at 95-102. This gives a brief examination of facts
and analysis presented to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure by the
Police Federation of England and Wales. The Federation, which represents the
police, has the duty and the authority to make representations on all welfare and
efficiency matters affecting the police. Id. at 102, note 1.
142. Richard Ford, 27-Point Plan has Yet to be Delivered, THE TIMES (London),
Oct. 13, 1994.
.143. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill is not limited to the right to
silence. It consists of many points including juvenile adjudication, cutting police
paperwork, tougher community sentences, court procedures, the bail process, and
sentencing. Id.
144. See Zander, supra note 11, at 14.
145. See Bawdon, supra note 130; Ede, supra note 10, at 12; Ford, supra note
4, at 1; Zander, supra note 11, at 14; Heather Mills & Terry Kir, Ending the Right
to Silence 'Is a Breach of Human Rights', THE INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 7,
1993, at 4.
146. Ede, supra note 10, at 12.
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ambiguous,147 it is unlikely that people will understand their legal
position when this caution is read.1" Confusion is likely to result
because the suspect is first told that he does not have to say
anything. 49 However, he is then told that if he remains silent
and does not put forth his defense or alibi during interrogation, the
court may use that against him."s
Historically, there has been a slight contradiction between the
rights and duties of an interviewee. The first principle of the
preamble of the Judges' Rules states that citizens have a duty to
assist police officers in discovering and apprehending offenders.'.
However, the actual Rule states that the suspect has the right to
silence. 5 In the past this so-called right to silence was enforced.
The proposed caution amplifies the tension between the right to
silence and the duty to assist police by bringing it to the attention
of both the police and the suspect. The question that remains
unanswered is whether the right or the duty prevails.
The Home Office argues that the caution still allows a suspect
to choose how to handle the interrogation.153 It is the conse-
quence of remaining silent that is not clear. If the suspect remains
silent, the court will be allowed to make adverse inferences. This
is contrary to the Davis holding that a judge cannot instruct the
jury to use its common sense when considering a suspect's refusal
to say anything. 4
Nonetheless, Clause 33 of the Criminal Justice and Public
Order Act specifically allows an adverse inference to be drawn
when the accused, questioned or charged, unreasonably fails to
mention a fact or excuse later relied upon in court. 5 However,
the unreasonableness standard is not explained in the new
caution.156 Consequently, it is unclear whether the term "unrea-
sonable" takes into account the many emotions that a suspect may
experience during his interview.
1 57
147. See supra part I.
148. See Ede, supra note 10, at 12.
149. See supra part I.
150. Id.
151.. Home Office Circular No. 31/1964, supra note 30, at 166.
152. Id.
153. See Ede, supra note 10, at 12.
154. Davis, supra note 127, at 218.
155. Home Office Circular No. 31/1964, supra note 30, at pmbl.
156. See supra part I.
157. See, e.g., Bawdon, supra note 130. A criminal law solicitor who was
questioned under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act described his experience
as follows: "Everything flashes through your mind. I was convinced that they had
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In addition, the new caution will result in: (1) drastic changes
to section 10 of the Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment
and Questioning of Persons15 or (2) police officers explaining the
caution and the rights of the suspect, pursuant to the Code Notes
of Guidance.159 All of section 10 is based on the general English
principle that suspects need not answer questions which may
incriminate." Ultimately section 10.4 will have to be altered to
accommodate a newly worded caution."' Furthermore, the notes
of guidance pertaining to that section1 62 also will have to be
changed to be consistent with the provisions in the Criminal Justice
and Public Order Act. Otherwise, to preserve the intent of the
Code Notes of Guidance, the police still will be required to explain
the caution and its significance to those who do not understand
it."6 Considering that one half of the British citizens tested by
researchers Claire and Gudjonnson did not understand the previous
caution," it is likely that the length and the complexity of the
new caution165 will result in police officers spending more time
attempting to get information from detainees. Officers will be
required to explain the consequences of the options granted by the
new right to silence.
B. The New Caution and the Right to Counsel
In the United States, Miranda warnings not only advise
suspects of the right to remain silent, but also of the right to legal
counsel."6 These rights are embodied in the Sixth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. 67 Although the British right
already made the decision to charge me if they could. I thought, 'I'm going to lose
everything my practice, my reputation, my home'." Id.
158. Codes of Practice, supra note 3, Code C, 9 10.
159. Id. at Notes 10C and 10D.
160. See generally id.
161. Id. 10.4. For the language of the new caution see supra part I.
162. Id. at Notes 10C and 10D.
163. This would be consistent with the guidelines accompanying the caution
instructions in 91 10.4 of Code C. Codes of Practice, supra note. 3, Code C, 10.4
164. Zander, supra note 11, at 14. Of the 100 adults tested by Claire and
Gudjohnson only 42% fully understood the old caution. Additionally, only 52%
understood that the caution was designed to inform people of their right to remain
silent. Id.
165. See Bawdon, supra note 130. Dr. Gudjonnson, a reader in forensic
psychology, is noted in this article as stating that the new caution will lead to many
legal battles because the caution deals not only with the option to speak, but also
with the consequences of that decision. Id.
166. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
167. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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to silence was only recently provided for by statute, the right to
counsel has been embodied in PACE since 1984."6 Section 58 of
PACE grants the accused the right to consult a solicitor 69 at any
time.
170
Due to the complexity of the new caution, it is argued that
there will be a greater demand for legal advice during the initial
proceedings.' 71 After PACE went into effect, only about twenty-
five percent of the people arrested requested a solicitor.72 In
1991, revisions were made to the Code of Practice77 requiring
that an arrested person be informed of his right to consult privately
with a solicitor 74 and that legal advice is available free of
charge. 75  In addition, the charging area must prominently
display a poster advertising the right to legal advice. 176  These
revisions appear to have had a significant effect. Specifically, in the
first five months after enactment of the revisions,"7 there was a
thirty-nine percent increase in the requests for Duty Solicitors.
78
The new right to silence raises concerns that the right and
access to counsel will be hindered.179 Although police officers are
forbidden from trying to dissuade a person from seeking legal
counsel,"8 it is possible that the proposed caution may result in
168. See PACE, supra note 14. Before PACE, the right to legal counsel was
also governed by the Judges' Rules. See Home Office Circular No. 31/1964, supra
note 30, at 166. The Preamble stated the principle "[t]hat every person at any
stage of an investigation should be able to communicate and to consult privately
with a solicitor." Id. at 167. This should be permitted as long as it does not cause
any unreasonable delay in the investigation process. Id.
169. For an extensive discussion of the differences between a solicitor and a
barrister, and other aspects of the legal profession see ZANDER, supra note 51, at
628-89.
170. PACE, supra note 14, at s 58.
171. Id.
172. ZANDER, supra note 51, at 155. About twenty percent actually get a
solicitor. Id.
173. Id. at 155-56.
174. Code of Practice, supra note 3, Code C, I 3.1(ii).
175. Id. For information on the Duty Solicitor Scheme see ZANDER, supra note
51, at 155-56, 520-22.
176. Code of Practice, supra note 3, Code C, 6.3. The poster should be in
English with translations into the principal European Community languages, the
main ethnic minority languages, and Welsh. Id. at Code C, Note 6H. The poster
should be displayed in places where such information is likely to be of assistance.
Id.
177. The 1991 revisions went into effect April 1, 1991. Codes of Practice, supra
note 3, at 1.
178. ZANDER, supra note 51, at 156.
179. See generally Ede, supra note 10, at 12.
180. Code of Practice, supra note 3, Code C, 6.4.
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even less legal consultation. The caution is complex and the
wording can be very intimidating, if not threatening. The language
may speak for itself and even convince people to talk without
recognizing the significant impact of the new wording. If this
happens, there will be an influx of petitions claiming that the
evidence gathered from the interview should be deemed inadmissi-
ble."'1 Petitions will also accumulate arguing that the exercise of
the right to silence should not be used against the defendant. Both
types of claims will be made on the basis that the defendant was
unable to fully understand the consequences of the caution."
Another concern is the method solicitors will use to advise
clients.1" Despite the police officers' belief that the solicitors will
advise suspects to exercise their right to silence,"8 studies have
shown that this advice is rarely given."S In the 1993 McConville-
Hodgson study for The Commission on Criminal Justice, only
seventeen percent of legal advisors gave unprompted advice to
remain silent;"8 another 4.8% advised silence when asked."8
The percentage of advisors who usually advised cooperating with
the police is 47.3,88 while another 30.9% generally gave no real
guidance.' 89
Nonetheless, the rationale for giving any advice is case
specific."9  In general, cooperation is advised if the suspect
admits the offense and there appears to be no reason to disbelieve
the client. 9' Cooperation will also be advised if the suspect gives
a defense or an explanation,"9 if the client denies any involve-
181. See Ford, supra note 4, at 1.
182. Id.
183. See Ede, supra note 10, at 12. In deciding whether or not to advise the
client to remain silent, the legal advisor is likely to find it difficult to determine
whether the court will consider it reasonable under the circumstances for the
accused to remain silent. Id.
184. MCCONVILLE & HODGSON, supra note 105, at 67.
185. See id. at 69, tbl. 5.1. This table gives advisors' broad strategies towards
police questions used by advisors. For information on client strategies for
confronting police questions, see tbl. 5.2. Id. at 70.
186. Id. at 69, tbl. 5.1.
187. Id.
188. MCCONVILLE & HODGSON, supra note 105, at 73-74.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 70.
191. Id. at 70-73. In this situation, despite the legalistic view that counsel
should be certain that every element of the crime is met and that there is a factual
basis to the admission, advisors rarely make such effort. Id. at 70.
192. See MCCONVILLE & HODGSON, supra note 105, at 73-74.
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ment and has an alibi,193 or if the advisor fears that exercising the
right to silence will be viewed negatively by the police and the trier
of fact.194
Advising cooperation because of fear of adverse inferences is
consistent with one motivation behind advising silence - the
counsel's opinion that the suspect may inadvertently make
incriminating remarks.'95 It is this situation that will occur more
frequently under a change in the right to silence caution.'96 It
will be difficult for counsel to determine when it is or is not
reasonable for a suspect to remain silent when faced with an
accusation." 7
One of the facts considered when deciding how to advise a
client is how much evidence the police already have.'98 In some
cases, cooperation will elicit information from the police that could
help in the defense. 99 In other cases, silence would be more
beneficial. For example, if the police have little or no evidence,
total silence may be the better approach to a police interrogation.
This is because clause 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order
Act will not allow adverse inferences to be drawn until evidence is
given against the accused of his failure to provide a defense during
the interrogation." ° As a result, "a person cannot be committed
for trial or have a case to answer partly on an inference.""' e
Before advising the client, the solicitor must: (1) weigh the
information given to him by the client; (2) determine whether or
not the police even have any evidence; and (3) consider any
statement made by the client before the legal advice was given. If
statements were already made, the limitation in clause 34 is
probably worthless to the client, and silence may be a disadvantage
to him. Conversely, the advisor must determine what the police
have against the client. Cooperation with the police may be helpful
in gathering more information, but it is done at the risk of self-
incrimination by the client.
193. See id. at 74-75.
194. See id. at 75-77.
195. See id. at 93-95.
196. Ede, supra note 10, at 12.
197. Id.
198. See MCCONVILLE & HODGSON, supra note 105.
199. Id.
200. Ede, supra note 10, at 12.
201. Id.
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The solicitor may also advise silence and state his advice and
rationale on the record' at the beginning of the interview. 3
At trial, the solicitor must then argue before the trier of fact that
he advised silence and that adverse inferences should not be
drawn.2' However, the solicitor may not be called upon to
explain why he advised his client to remain silent as it may be a
violation of the advisor-client privilege.
20 5
Due to the uncertain effects of the new caution, a suspect may
question tactical advice given by a solicitor sometime in the
future.' °  If a solicitor offers erroneous advice the suspect could
change legal advisors and then claim in evidence that he should not
be penalized for the first solicitor's error.' If this approach
proves ineffective, the solicitor may be liable for misrepresentation.
C. The Judicial Effect
The biggest concern over the new right to silence goes beyond
the police station and focuses instead on the courtroom. The
impact was of great enough concern to result in its inclusion in the
caution,2 as recommended by the Home Office Working
Group.'
Under clause 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act,
if the accused is questioned or charged with a criminal offense and
unreasonably fails to mention something which he later relies upon
in his defense, an adverse inference can be drawn.210 The prose-
cutor may then ask the court to draw an adverse inference of guilt
from the silence exercised during interrogation.211  Furthermore,
the prosecutor may ask the court to add the adverse inference "to
202. An accurate and verbatim record of the interview must be made. Code
of Practice, supra note 3, Code C,,11 11.5(a),(c). If a verbatim record cannot be
made, an account summarizing the interview must be drafted. Id I 11.5(c):
203. Ede, supra note 10, at 12. The legal advisor is also entitled to the
opportunity to read and sign the written record of the interview. Codes of
Practice, supra note 3, Code C, 1 11.11
204. By advising silence, a solicitor may lose his credibility with the jury and
ultimately cause the defendant's credibility to be harmed. Zander, supra note 11,
at 14. Suspects who are solicitors by occupation are especially reluctant to
exercise the right to silence for fear of how the jury would interpret a legal
advisor's inability to give an explanation. See Bawdon, supra note 130.
205. EASTON, supra note 48, at 118.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See supra part I.
209. EASTON, supra note 48, at 27.
210. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, ch. 33, § (1)(d).
211. Id.
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other evidence in order to make out a prima facie case.
12
Other evidence added to the inference can be as little as what was
needed to create the reasonable grounds needed for arrest."3
The judge may then comment to the jury that they can make an
adverse inference.2 4 Thus, the exercise of the right to silence
may ultimately influence the jury's determination of guilt or
innocence.
The judge is required to summarize both the law and the
facts. 215 The summation of facts can severely influence the jury's
decision,216 rather than restating the facts in a clear, logical, and
impartial fashion.2 7 Mr. Justice Bridge, in his three day summary
of the 'Birmingham Six' case,218 gave innumerable indications of
his opinion favoring the prosecution.219 Further, he believed that
a judge should be able to express his opinion to the jury "and not
pretend to be a kind of Olympian detached observer."2" View-
points such as those expressed and acted upon by Mr. Justice
Bridge, accompanied by the statutory permission to do so, could
result in disaster. Such thinking and action will lead to interference
with the jury's duty and infringement of the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination.
IV. Treatment of Britain's Right to Silence by the European
Court
A disgruntled defendant who has exhausted his domestic
remedies221 has one other option outside the English judicial
system. That option is to file a petition to the Secretary General
of the Council of Europe alleging that he is a victim of a violation




214. Contra Davis, supra note 127, at 218.
215. ZANDER, supra note 51, at 454.
216. Id. at 457.
217. Id. at 456.
218. The Birmingham Six defendants were charged with IRA bombings of pubs
that resulted in many injuries and deaths. Id. at 457.
219. Id.
220. ZANDER, supra note 51, at 457.
221. Convention, supra note 19, art. 26.
222. Id. art. 25 (1). The petition must be filed within six months from the date
of final decision. Id. art. 26.
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A. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms
The Council of Europe [hereinafter Council] was established
in May 1949 and is still very active today.2" The aim of the
Council is "to achieve a greater unity between its Members."'224
Conditions of membership in this organization include the recogni-
tion and maintenance of human rights and respect for the rule of
law within each member's jurisdiction.2'
During 1949 and 1950, the Council drafted a convention on
human rights.2' The Council embraced the cause of human
rights for two main reasons.2" First, there was fear of a resur-
gence of a dictatorship in Western Europe.' The Members of
the Council wanted to be able to detect the makings of a dictator-
ship early, to prevent disaster in that country and all of Europe,
and to restore that land to a democratic society.22 9 The Members
sought to institute the rights and freedoms to be respected in
democratic nations, and to establish an institution to monitor these
rights.' Second, the growing tension between the East and the
West prompted the Council to create the Convention." The
Council members were well aware of the Soviet threat of commu-
nism. 2 The Convention was a reaffirmation of their beliefs in
the value of democracy.3
The Convention was signed in Rome on November 4,
1950.3 It became effective on September 3, 1953"3 following
its ratification by eight member countries, 6 the first being the
223. A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 2
(1993).
224. Id. at 3.
225. Id.
226. MARK W. JANIS & RICHARD S. KAY, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
1 (1990).




231. Id. at 4.
232. ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 223, at 4.
233. Id.
234. JANIS & KAY, supra note 226, at 1.
235. Id.
236. Id. The first eight ratifying countries were Denmark, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. Id.
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United Kingdom. 7  By signing the Convention, the members
reiterated their belief in the fundamental freedoms which form the
"foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best
maintained, on the one hand, by an effective political democracy
and on the other by a common understanding and observance of
the Human Rights upon which they depend.11
238
The Convention provided for the establishment of a judicial
institution to oversee and enforce the Convention upon its
signatories.2 9 The Convention created a European Commission
of Human Rights (Commission) and a European Court of Human
Rights (Court).2' The Commission is empowered to receive
complaints from any individual, group of individuals, or non-
governmental organization asserting itself as a victim of a violation
by one of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention.241 If
the Commission is unsuccessful in crafting a favorable settlement
between the victim and the High Contracting Party, the case may
be brought before the Court24 2 by either the Commission or the
High Contracting Party.243
Both the United Kingdom and France opposed the proposition
of creating a Commission and a Court.2' These two nations
actually drafted a proposal rejecting the recommendation of the
Committee on Legal and Administrative Question to create a
Commission and a Court.24 5 After a two day debate, the proposal
to reject the Committee recommendation was itself, rejected, and
the concept of a judicial system was approved.2
The United Kingdom then proposed that individuals be
forbidden from filing complaints with the Commission. This was
motivated in part by the belief that there would be a myriad of
applications from individuals imagining they have a complaint
against the country.247  The proposal was supported by Nor-
237. The United Kingdom ratified the Convention in March 1951 and the First
Protocol in November 1952. ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 223, at 13.
238. Convention, supra note 19, at pmbl.
239. Id. art. 19.
240. Id.
241. Id. art. 25.
242. Id. art. 47.
243. " Convention, supra note 19, arts. 44 and 48.
244. JANIS & KAY, supra note 226, at 30.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 29.
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way,248 but rejected by the Council. The Council reasoned that
allowing individual access was consistent with the principle of
preserving human dignity.249 As a result of so much debate, the
Committee of Ministers made optional both the jurisdiction of the
Court and the right of individuals to file a petition.2 The
United Kingdom did not consent to the optional clauses when it
ratified the Convention."1 Further, the United Kingdom did not
consent when the Court was established in 1958.252 It was not
until after years of debate in Parliament that the United Kingdom
finally consented to both optional provisions. 3
B. The Convention's Treatment of the Right to Silence
The Convention does not specifically provide that persons
charged with a criminal offense have the right to remain silent.
Instead, somewhat related freedoms are described in articles 5-
8.' Specifically, article 5 ensures that everyone has liberty and
security rights. " Article 6 provides for the entitlement of a fair
and public hearing, the presumption of innocence, and some other
minimum rights.16 In accordance with article 7, individuals may
only be charged with criminal offenses that exist at the time of the
action and be penalized in accordance with the provisions at the
time of the crime. 7 Last in this cluster of freedoms related to
the right to silence, article 8 grants individuals the right "to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspon-
dence."" 8
248. See id. at 29-30. (Norway's objection to allowing individuals to petition the
Commission).
249. JANIS & KAY, supra note 226, at 30.
250. Id. at 32.
251. See generally id. at 34-37.
252. See generally id.
253. See id. at 34-35 (arguments made in Parliament).
254. See generally Convention, supra note 19, arts. 5-8.
255. Id. art. 5(1). Article 5 provides for the advisement of what charges a
person is being arrested or the reasons for detainment. Id. art. 5(2). Additionally,
every arrested or detained person is entitled to promptly be brought before a
judge or other appropriate person with similar authority and receive a trial within
a reasonable time. l art. 5(3).
256. Id. arts. 6(1), (2), and (3).
257. Convention, supra note 19, at art. 7.
258. Id. art. 8.
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C Funke v. France
Although it is not statutorily provided, the Court has upheld
the right to remain silent to preserve the privilege against self-
incrimination 59 In Funke v. France, Funke's house was searched
in January, 1980 by customs officers looking for information about
his assets abroad.2"° Funke was a German national who lived in
Strasbourg with his French wife.2 61 He admitted having several
accounts abroad, but insisted that the paperwork was not at
home. 62 The Strasbourg police court imposed a 1200 FF fine on
Funke and ordered him to produce certain documents.2" Fur-
ther, he was subject to a 20 FF penalty per day of delay.2" The
Colmar Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's order for
production of all but one set of documents and increased the fine
to 50 FF per day.26 Funke's appeal on points of law was dis-
missed by the Court of Cassation (Criminal Division).266 The
customs authorities were unable to garnish Funke's bank ac-
count.267 However, the Strasbourg District Court granted an
attachment of Funke's property, to a value of over 100,000 FF for
confiscation of undeclared funds and payment for the fine.26 The
Colmar Court of Appeal dismissed Funke's appeal of that judg-
269ment.
In his February, 1984 application to the Commission, Funke
claimed, among other things, that his criminal conviction for
refusing to produce documents violated his right to a fair trial
which is granted by article 6(1).270 In October 1988, the Commis-
sion accepted his application.271 In its opinion of October 8, 1991,
259. See Funke v. France, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 297 (1993) (Court report).
260. Id. at 299.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 299-300.
263. Id. at 300.
264. Funke, supra note 259, at 300.
265. Id. at 301.
266. Id. at 302.
267. See id. at 303.
268. Id. at 303-304.
269. Funke, supra note 259, at 304.
270. Id. at 308. Article 6(1) states: "In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law." Convention, supra note 19, art. 6(1).
271. Funke, supra note 259, at 308.
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the Commission held that France did not breach any part of the
Convention.272
As such, the Court disagreed with the Commission's opinion.
It found that the customs officials were trying to obtain certain
documents which they believed, but did not know for certain,
existed.273 Because the officials did not believe that they could
obtain the paperwork by another means, they attempted to compel
Funke to produce evidence supporting a criminal case against
himself.274 The Court held that "[t]he special features of customs
law cannot justify such an infringement of the right of anyone
'charged with a criminal offence,' within the autonomous meaning
of this expression in article 6, to remain silent and not to contribute
to incriminating itself., 275  Accordingly, the Court held that the
actions of the French authorities breached article 6(1) of the
Convention thereby prohibiting a fair trial.276
As noted, article 6 does not specifically guarantee the right to
silence. The Court's statement protecting the right to silence and
the right against self-incrimination was a broad interpretation of
article 6. Article 6(3) lists a minimum of rights given to anyone
charged with a criminal offense.2" However, the right to silence
is not mentioned,27 and the Court did not use article 6(3) as part
of its decision.279
D. Ernest Saunders v. United Kingdom
In 1990, former Guinness plc chairman, Ernest Saunders was
convicted on charges brought by the Serious Fraud Office.2'n As
a result of participating in an illegal stock manipulation scheme
272. Id. The full text of the Commission opinion is reprinted in the Court's
opinion at 309-24.
273. Id. at 326.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Funke, supra note 259, at 330.
277. Convention, supra note 19, art. 6(3). The minimum rights include the
following: (a) to be informed promptly and in a language which the accused can
understand of the accusation; (b) adequate time for preparation of defense; (c) to
have legal assistance present (and provided free of charge if deemed within the
interests of justice); (d) to present and examine own witnesses and cross-examine
witnesses against him; and (e) to have a free interpreter if he does not understand
the language used in court. Id.
278. See id.
279. Funke, supra note 259, at 325-26.
280. Paul Wilkinson, Four Guinness Fraud Plotters Found Guilty, THE TIMEs
(London), Aug. 28, 1990, at 1.
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during a takeover battle of Distillers Co.,281 Saunders was found
guilty of two counts of conspiracy, two counts of theft from his
company, and eight counts of false accounting.' He was sen-
tenced to five years for conspiracy and theft,' and a concurrent
three and one half years for the charges of false accounting.
2 4
Because of his medical condition, Saunders' sentence was re-
duced' to two and one half years for the conspiracy and theft
and a concurrent one and one half years for the false account-
ing.
286
Saunders filed 'an lapplication with: the Commission charging
the United Kingdom with denying him a fair hearing.7 While
being investigated by the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), Saunders
was interrogated by the inspectors of the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI).' Any suspect refusing to answer questions
posed by DTI inspectors is subject to imprisonment.' There is
no right to silence for those suspected of city corruption.2" The
answers that Saunders was forced to give during those interroga-
tions were directly quoted by SFO prosecutors in court.29 1 The
Commission, in a 14-1 majority opinion, found the manner in which
DTI investigators questioned Ernest Saunders to be a violation of
the European Convention.292
The Commission declared that the use of DTI's investigative
powers had "oppressive" and "substantially impaired" Ernest
Saunders' ability to defend the criminal charges against him.
293
281. Distillers Company was a gin and Scotch whiskey maker. 'Guinness Affair'
Shakes British Financial Circles, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 1988, pt. 4, at 5.
282. Four Convicted in Guinness Case, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST,
Aug. 31, 1990, at 642, F2.
283. Guinness Exec Gets 5 Years in Fraud Case, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 29, 1990, Bus.
at 3.
284. Id.
285. Medical evidence introduced to the court reported that Ernest Saunders
was suffering from a form of pre-senile dementia and brain atrophy. R. v.
Saunders, [1991] Court of Appeal, Crim. Div. transcript by THE INDEPENDENT.
286. Id.
287. See Marckus, supra note 18, at 24.
288. Human Rights: Unconventional, ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 1994, at 56.
289. Id. at 61. DTI inspectors can demand almost any information or
documentation from people being interviewed. Kane, supra note 16. DTI
inspectors are not required to reveal why they are asking the questions or for what
reasons the documents must be handed over. Id.
290. Michael Prescott, European Ruling Hits City Corruption Fight, SUNDAY
TIMES (London), Sept. 18, 1994.
291. Human Rights: Unconventional, supra note 288, at 56.
292. Prescott, supra note 290.
293. Marckus, supra note 18, at 24.
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The effect of the use of the evidence gathered by DTI inspectors
deprived Saunders of his fair hearing," as established by article
6 of the Convention."29 In addition, the Commission expressed
concern about the inconsistencies of prosecution based on different
types of offenses.2 96 The right to silence must be applied uni-
formly throughout the criminal justice system, and not applied
according to various degrees of crimes.2' The Commission stated
that "[tihere can be no legitimate aim in depriving someone of the
guarantees necessary in securing a fair trial.,
298
1 The Commission, consistent with article 44,299 recommended
Ernest Saunders v. United Kingdom to the Court. 3  If the Court
rules infavor of Saunders, which it is predicted to do,30 1 reports
gathered under the-compulsion of DTI inspectors will be inadmissi-
ble.
30 2
The SFO also has the power to compel answers of suspects or
anyone believed to hold relevant information °. 30  However, unlike
the powers of DTI, the SFO cannot use this evidence directly in
court,304 but can only use it for investigation purposes. 30 5  The
ruling by the Commission is likely to bring forth a case in which a
person was convicted by the SFO as an indirect result of the
compulsory investigation.
E. Treatment of the New Right by the Strasbourg Judiciary
With the implementation of the Criminal Justice and Public
Order Act, suspects will be compelled to answer questions.
Although the proposed caution says that a suspect does not have
to say anything, if nothing is said at the first reasonable opportuni-
ty, the silence can be used against the defendant. 3' Application
of the new law would allow police officers to warn suspects that if
294. Id.
295. Convention, supra note 19, art. 6.
296. Marckus, supra note 18, at 24.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Convention, supra note 19, art. 44.
300. Marckus, supra note 18, at 24.
301. See William Rees-Mogg, Through a Glass Darkly, THE TIMES (London),
Sept. 22, 1994, at 18.
302. Human Rights: Unconventional, supra note 288, at 56.
303. See Criminal Justice Act 1987, supra note 16, s 2(2).
304. Id. s 2(8). See also Human Rights: Unconventional, supra note 288, at 56.
305. Human Rights: Unconventional, supra note 288, at 56.
306. Id.
307. See generally Schmidt, supra note 6, at B20.
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they do not cooperate it may adversely affect their case. This is
extremely similar to the procedures used by the DTI that have
been severely criticized by the Commission.3
If the Court rules that the investigatory procedures and
subsequent admissions into evidence used in the Saunders case are
a violation of the Convention, changes will have to be made in DTI
procedures. If changes are not made, evidence gathered by the
current DTI method will be inadmissible. The Court's decision
could lead to changes in the SFO procedures, either by Parlia-
ment's own initiative, or as a result of an inevitable petition to
Strasbourg. The procedures of regular police officers also could
eventually be changed. With the implementation of the new
caution, those new procedures could occur sooner than ever
anticipated.
Under the new caution, if a suspect exercises the right to
silence and it is subsequently used against him, an application to
the Commission is likely to be filed.3' Due to the implementa-
tion of the new law, the argument before Strasbourg will probably
be based on articles 6(1), 6(3), and 7 of the Convention.
Consistent with the Court's ruling in Funke v. France, an
applicant is likely to argue that the right to silence is embodied in
the right to a fair trial.31 Article 6 focuses on the entitlements
of someone charged with a criminal offense.3  The primary right
contained in article 6 is that of a fair and public hearing.
312
Two arguments against the new law could be made under
article 6(3). First, this article states that "[e]veryone charged with
a criminal offence has the following minimum rights ,,313
Although the rights specifically listed do not include the right to
silence, the phrase "minimum rights" leaves this article open for
interpretation and expansion. To include the right to silence here
would be consistent with the Funke interpretation of the rights
given to a person charged with a criminal offense.314  Further-
308. See Human Rights: Unconventional, supra note 288, at 61.
309. Petitions to the Commission can be made by any person, group of persons,
or non-governmental organizations claiming to be a victim of a violation of the
Convention by a High Contracting Party. Convention, supra note 19, art. 25.
310. Funke, supra note 259, at 326.
311. Convention, supra note 19, art. 6(1). See also note 270 and accompanying
text.
312. Id.
313. Id. art. 6(3). See also note 277 and accompanying text.
314. See Funke, supra note 259, at 309-19.
RIGHT TO SILENCE IN GREAT BRITAIN
more, the right to remain silent is consistent with the minimum
rights specifically listed in article 6(3).315
With the proposed caution, the second assertion that a
petitioner can make under article 6(3) is that the person charged
with a criminal offense will not have "adequate time and facilities
for the preparation of his defense., 316  The caution tells the
suspect that if he wants to use something in his defense at trial he
must first mention it during the questioning period.317 Conse-
quently, this does not leave time for the suspect and his advisor to
speak at length to determine' what defense will or should be put
forth at trial. Without time and facilities to prepare a defense, as
allowed by the Convention, the suspect may not be able to raise his
defense during interrogation. Therefore, according to the new law,
the failure to raise a defense during interrogation may be used
against the defendant in court.318 The result of this will be a
violation of Convention article 6(3)(b) guaranteeing adequate time
to prepare.31 In some cases, this may also be a violation of
article 6(3)(c) which guarantees the accused the right to defend
himself or through legal assistance.3"
The implementation of, and conviction under, the newly
worded caution is also likely to raise an argument before the
Commission under article 7.321 Because the caution states that
the suspect does not have to say anything, the suspect is told that
the right to silence is legal and is not a criminal offense. However,
if the suspect follows this law, his silence could be held against him.
The judge can instruct the jury to make inferences about the
accused's prior silence thus resulting in the suspect's conviction.
Conviction of a criminal offense because the suspect exercised the
right to silence during interrogation is a violation of article 7.
Therefore, a person who is found guilty on account of his exercise
of a legal right can then be considered a victim of a Convention
violation. More than likely, nothing could be done under the
British judicial system because the British judges cannot directly
315. See supra note 277.
316. See id.
317. See supra part I.
318. See generally Schmidt, supra note 6, at B20.
319. Convention, supra note 19, art. 6(3)(b).
320. Id. art. 6(3)(c).
321. Article 7 of the European Convention states that "[n]o one shall be held
guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not
constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when
it was committed . . .". Id art. 7.
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enforce the Convention in their courts.3" Nonetheless, the victim
can bring an action in Strasbourg.
323
Since the United Kingdom has permanently adopted the
Convention provision to allow individuals to bring grievances
before the Commission,324 the government will be subject to
judgments against it for violations of the Convention. The United
Kingdom will then be forced to make changes in the laws or face




The right to silence in Great Britain has finally been codi-
fied.3' However, it appears to provide less protection than the
prior right to silence which was simply considered a general
principle of common law. A person's right to not say anything is
contradicted by two problems: (1) the social duty to assist in a
police investigation327 and (2) the negative inference that the trier
of fact will be permitted to draw from the suspect's silence.3 8
Parliament's actions in this area will have sweeping effects on
the rights of criminal suspects. The newly worded caution inhibits
the right against self-incrimination, the right to counsel,329 and the
overriding right to a fair trial. The citizens of the United Kingdom
will now have to rely upon the Convention to fight for their
protection. However, this is a very lengthy process from the time
of interrogation to a Court decision.330  Until a British citizen
goes through this entire process, the right to silence is certain to
deprive many people of their right to be. treated fairly by the
criminal justice system.
Diane Beckman
322. Human Rights: Unconventional, supra note 288, at 56. Currently, members
of the European Union are considering incorporating the Human Rights
Convention into European Union law. Id. Because England is bound by that law,
judges would be able to directly refer to and enforce the Convention. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 61.
325. Human Rights: Unconventional, supra note 288, at 61.
326. See Schmidt, supra note 6, at B20.
327. Codes of Practice, supra note 3, Code C, at Note D.
328. Schmidt, supra note 6, at B20.
329. PACE, supra note 14, at s 58.
330. The Funke affair lasted 13 years from the first search to the Court
decision. See Funke, supra note 259, at 297, 299.
